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Abstract. This paper presents an approach to formalize the influence of culture 
on the decision functions of agents in social simulations. The key components 
are (a) a definition of the domain of study in the form of a decision model, (b) 
knowledge acquisition based on a dimensional theory of culture, resulting in 
expert validated computational models of the influence of single dimensions (c) 
a technique for integrating the knowledge about individual dimensions. The 
approach is developed in a line of research, studying the influence of culture on 
trade processes. Trade is an excellent subject for this study because it is 
ubiquitous, relevant both socially and economically, and often cross-cultural in 
a globalized world. 
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1   Introduction 
Being competent in trading depends on more than economic rationality. To model 
trade as it actually happens, creating agents that compute the most profitable deal is 
therefore not enough. The agents’ incentives could be modeled using Williamson’s  
framework [1] in which four time scales are used: resource allocation (for instance: 
trade) happens continuously, and it is subject to governance rules that may change on 
a time scale of 1 to 10 years. These rules are themselves subject to institutional 
changes, e.g. new legislation, at a time scale of 10 to 100 years. Institutions in their 
turn are based on and attuned  to the hidden rules of the game (culture) that are 
embedded in society and change on a time scale of 100 to 1000 years. So this model 
states that people involved in trade use governance rules, institutions and cultural 
values to guide their behavior, albeit unconsciously. The present article takes this 
position as a basis for modeling the culture’s effects on agent-based social 
simulations. 
Societies around the world differ greatly with respect to the value systems and 
ideas that govern patterns of human interaction.. Hofstede [2], p.9, defines culture as 
“the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group 
of people from another”. The behavior of people and their interpretation of the 
behavior of others are based on their norms for appropriate behavior. These norms 
vary from culture to culture. 
In different cultures, different norms may prevail for behavior in trade; e.g., trade 
partner selection, bargaining style, trust that has to be shown, favor that is given to in-
group relations or high-ranked society members, and opportunistic advantage that 
may be taken from partners. Different systems may be viable in different societies. 
For example, [3] used multi-agent simulations to show that economic systems based 
on trust and systems based on opportunism may both be viable.  
When traders operate in foreign cultures, the programming of their minds may not 
be efficient. This explains the existence of practical guides for business behavior in 
different countries, e.g. [4] and [5], and the extensive body of scientific literature that 
has been developed. The scientific literature ranges from business oriented studies, 
e.g. Kumar [6], and cross-cultural surveys, e.g., Kersten et al. [7], to economic 
models, e.g., Guo [8] and Kónya [9].  
The approach proposed in this paper aims to model culture at the mid-range level 
according to the classification by Gilbert [10], p.42. Mid-range models depend on a 
rich description of processes, but do not in facsimile model a particular situation. For 
mid-range models, observed trends should be similar to those observed in reality. This 
is important for our long-term research goal of improving the understanding of human 
decision-making in international supply chains with asymmetric information, see, for 
instance, [11]. The research method proposed in [11] combines multi-agent models 
with gaming simulation, but a general multi-agent-based model as proposed in [11] 
does not explain the cultural difference observed in the gaming simulations. 
Therefore, it is important to develop an approach to culturally adapt the models. 
For the modeling of culture, one must lean on social sciences literature. Two main 
streams of research can be distinguished. First, there is the anthropological approach 
of rich description, in which specific cultures are studied by detailed and close 
observation of behaviors during an extensive time-span. Examples are the works of 
Lévi-Strauss [12] and Geertz [13]. Second, there is the comparative approach that 
tries to identify dimensions on which different cultures can be ordered, aiming to 
develop a classification system in which cultures can be typed by a small number of 
qualifications. Examples are the models of culture by G. Hofstede [2], Schwarz [14], 
and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner [15]. The approach of that type of research 
research is to characterize cultures by their indices on a limited number of 
dimensions. The dimensions and the indices of cultures are typically created by factor 
analyzing massive surveys with standardized questionnaires in many countries. The 
value of such dimensions largely depends on the questionnaires used in combination 
with the sets of respondents that are required. Questionnaire studies will be more 
reliable predictors of behavior if they are about the desired (for self) than if they are 
about the desirable (for everyone), and also if they are asked to a broad range of types 
of respondents as opposed to just one type (e.g., students or managers). The resulting 
models provide a linear ordering of cultures along each dimension, where particular 
values and practices are hypothesized (based on empirical evidence) to be stronger or 
weaker or occur more frequently or less frequently according to the index on the 
dimension. For instance, in cultures on one extreme of a particular dimension 
concerned with asymmetry of power relations, the implicit norm is for parents to treat 
children as equals, while in cultures on the other end parents are supposed to teach 
children obedience. As authors of dimensional models stress, these same implicit 
norms carry over to all relationships in society that involve potential power 
differences, whether in school, in politics or in trade. In all social situations, they act 
as filters on perception and on action range. This means that there are no specific 
values for activity x, e.g. ‘trade values’, in a dimensional model. It also means that a 
dimensional model is suited for modeling any process that involves social intercourse, 
including trade and its sub-activities. 
Cultural descriptions of the first type provide rich details about values, norms, 
symbols, beliefs, rituals, social structure, behavioral patterns etc. in a particular 
culture. These will prove very useful for facsimile modeling of specific social 
systems. The model proposed in the present paper aims to compare the influence of a 
great diversity of cultures in the standardized environment of a gaming simulation 
which is by itself an abstraction of social life. For that purpose we need to posit the 
model at an impartial distance from any single culture. A dimensional model of 
culture is more suited than a collection of incommensurable rich descriptions. 
Dimensional models are culture-level abstractions. They do not depict individuals, but 
average group characteristics, and therefore the agents in our simulation will be iconic 
for a culture (mid-range, in our term), not specific for any individual (facsimile, in our 
term). 
Of the well-known dimensional models, the most widely used is Hofstede [2]. His 
work is accessible, sparse, and based on a very large, very well stratified sample of 
questions on the desirable for self, asked of people in all professions that continues to 
give it great explanatory value. No other model matches society-level variables so 
well to date [18].  
The hypothesis of this research is that computational models of culturally 
differentiated agents can be deduced from social scientific theories that differentiate 
cultures, including the way members of such a culture interact with other people, 
along a limited number of dimensions. An agent-based model can be developed to 
incorporate behavior and agent interactions which are realistically differentiated along 
each of the cultural dimensions. Note that the model based on the cultural indices may 
reliably reproduce general trends, but will not differentiate up to the detail of actual 
individuals. For the long term, a computational model based on a dimensional theory 
of culture in multi-agent-based simulations can provide insights into the functioning 
of social systems and institutions in different cultural contexts. 
To develop computational models of culturally differentiated agents in a specific 
domain of application a general agent-based model for that domain of application can 
be taken as a point of departure. That general model should be based on either a task, 
process, or activity analysis of the domain of application. A dimensional theory of 
culture can be used to determine the required adaptations to the model to reflect the 
way culture influences behavior trends. Such adaptations also pertain to the way the 
agents perceive their environment and the behavior of other agents. For instance, if 
the theory describes that in some cultures favor is to be shown to in-group customers, 
while in other cultures the norm is to treat all customers equally, the agents need a 
cognitive model in which they can be aware of what group they belong to and 
maintain models of other agents in which they maintain beliefs about other agents’ 
group memberships (e.g., “I belong to group x and he/she does/does not belong to that 
group”). For each of the processes of the general model, an adaptation must be 
developed that models the adaptation of decisions by culture. This paper describes an 
approach to develop computational adaptations of the processes within the agent that 
are based on a dimensional model of culture, and expert knowledge about cultural 
effects on decisions and interpretation of behaviors.  
The case for which the approach described in this paper has been developed is a 
simulation game of trade under asymmetric information [17]. A multi-agent-based  
simulation of this game has been developed [11], with two purposes: to test 
hypotheses about players’ decision making and to design optimal configurations for 
human games. When playing the game with human participants, differences in 
outcomes were observed that were attributed to differences in cultural background 
[17]. The latter was the rationale for modeling culture into the artificial agents.  
The process model for trading agents acting in the game is given in Fig. 1. The 
plans that the agents execute for process fulfillment are based on validated models 
taken from literature on social sciences and artificial intelligence. 
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Fig. 1. Processes and internal information flows of trading agents (adapted from [18]) 
The agent’s decision models implemented in the plans for process fulfillment were 
adapted to include effects of culture, based on Hofstede’s [2] dimensional model. The 
present paper describes the approach taken to incorporate the dimensional model of 
culture into the decision functions. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents an overview of the method that was followed in knowledge acquisition and 
model formulation. Section 3 formulates the computational model. A discussion of 
results concludes the paper. 
2   Modeling Method 
The exercise of modeling culture in trading agents could be carried out in a 
multitude of ways, using a variety of theories. The present article describes one such 
attempt. It also presents the choices and the line of reasoning behind this method. This 
could enable other researchers to choose which of the principles, choices and 
practices of this approach to adopt and from which ones to deviate. 
In order to model cultural differentiation in agents the following steps were taken, 
once the domain to be modeled had been defined. Agent roles and network, agent 
communications, the environment and entities in it, their observable properties and 
possible actions of agents were defined. For the agents, a process model had been 
established. Throughout this paper, specific examples are taken from the domain of 
trading agents, see Fig. 1 for a process model. 
In each process the agents take decisions based on decision rules. For these rules, 
models were preferred that had in empirical research been validated to simulate actual 
human behavior. For instance, in the model of culture implemented by the authors, 
the ABMP negotiation architecture is applied. It has been validated in experiments 
with Dutch adolescents and adults [19]. If no validated model can be found in 
literature, a dedicated model has to be formulated based on empirical data or research; 
see, for instance, [20].  
The decision models taken from literature can be implemented as a set of rules (the 
agent’s knowledge base. Typically, the decision rules are parameterized. For instance, 
parameters in the rules of the ABMP negotiation strategy have names like concession 
factor, negotiation speed, impatience. So, the decision model can be formulated as a 
set of parameterized rules, and the labels of the parameters can be listed. We refer to 
this modeling activity as “decision function analysis”. The results are the decision rule 
base and a list of parameter labels (see Fig.2). 
 
        
Fig. 2. Decision function analysis1 
The decision rule parameters are the point of application for cultural 
differentiation. It is important to start from process models that allow for such 
adaptation. Validations of behavior with subjects from one culture are no guarantee 
for the occurrence of similar behavior in other cultures. This is amply shown by a 
multitude of experimental studies published in journals such as the Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, and in review volumes such as [21]. This fact implies that 
ideally, only models shown to be valid across cultures should be used. This condition 
could not be met for all the models used in this paper. The Hofstede dimensions of 
culture were derived using a sample of people in a broad range of professions from 
over 70 countries on all continents, and explicitly aiming to compare these countries. 
They qualify. For the ABMP negotiation architecture, however, we had to be content 
with validation in only one culture. Further validations in other countries of ABMP 
could yield results that necessitate revisions of our agent models. 
For the cultural differentiation a dimensional model of culture was selected, in this 
case Hofstede’s five-dimensional model [2]. Two criteria were important in the 
selection. First, the model had to be applicable for the social processes to be 
simulated, based on the contexts in which it has been developed and validated, and 
the availability of research results that provide rules for decision parameter 
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 Legend of Fig. 2…5:           
adaptation. As argued in section 1, this condition holds for the Hofstede framework. 
Second, the modelers had to have access to expertise on the cultural model to be 
applied, for knowledge acquisition and expert validation of results.  
Knowledge about the influence of individual dimensions of culture on the decision 
functions of the process model was acquired, using the concept of Synthetic Cultures 
[22] complemented by an expert systems approach. Synthetic Cultures are scripts, 
created by experts on cross-cultural communication,  that catch a single extreme of a 
single dimension of culture in rules of behavior. They have been created for use in 
training counselors [22] and later adapted for use in simulation gaming for a multitude 
of applications [23]. Synthetic Cultures lead to believable behavior by simulation 
participants, and to realistic cross-cultural miscommunication, even though the 
synthetic cultures themselves are obviously unrealistic. Since their publication, a 
number of simulations based on synthetic cultures were created, the synthetic cultures 
were refined based on experience [24] and they have become adopted by cross-
cultural trainers around the world. 
Literature and expert knowledge are mostly based on differentiation along the 
dimensions. It is feasible to acquire knowledge on the differentiation along a single 
dimension, whereas it proved to be impossible in practice to interpret the joint 
influence of multiple dimensions on general rules. A classical knowledge acquisition 
approach was followed for each dimension: interview experts on the cultural theory, 
read literature, write narratives of expected system behavior, have experts validate the 
narratives, correct until the experts have confidence in the narratives. In addition to 
the narratives, the knowledge acquisition resulted in a list of relevant cultural factors2 
for each dimension. On the basis of the knowledge gained, the influence of the 
relevant factors for a single dimension on each parameterized decision rule can be 
formalized as a set of rules that modify the parameter values. See Fig. 3 for an 
overview of these steps. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Knowledge acquisition and formalization 
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 Some dimensions adapt the perceived relevance of certain relational attributes. For instance, 
the salience of common group membership (in-group versus out-group) is adapted by the 
dimension of individualism versus collectivism. Other such relational attributes are status 
difference and trust. ‘Cultural factors’ combine dimension scores and relational attributes. 
The next activity in the modeling was to implement the rules in multi-agent-based 
models for each single dimension Fig. 4. The step of the modeling per dimension is 
described for each of Hofstede’s dimensions in [25], [26], [27], [28], and [29]. The 
results of these models can only be validated by expert validation. In reality, cultures 
are composites of all dimensions and interactions with other dimensions distort the 
effect being modeled.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Computational modeling and validation for a single dimension 
Finally, the parameter adaptation rules of the individual dimensions were 
combined into an integrated set of rules, as the basis for a computational model of the 
simultaneous influence of all dimensions (Fig. 5). The integration technique used to 
integrate the adaptation rules is the subject of the present paper. This technique has 
been applied in models for the agent’s processes of partner selection [30], negotiation 
[31], and delivery, monitoring and enforcing, and belief update [20]. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Integration and computational modeling of joint dimensions 
3   Integrated Computational Model 
This section describes the approach taken to integrate the parameter adaptation rules 
for the single dimensions into an agent model that simulates an complete cultural 
“Gestalt”. The approach has been applied to differentiate trading agents in a 
simulation game according to Hofstede’s dimensions, but it is described in a more 
general way. The approach might also be applied for other dimensional models or  to 
other processes where the decisions can be described by parameterized rules and data 
or expertise is available to assess the effects of culture on the parameter values. From 
this general perspective, we formulate the approach as follows. 
Assume for some domain of application that a set of adapted decision rules per 
dimension and accompanying sets of parameters and cultural factors are given (see 
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3). This section discusses an approach to integrating all this knowledge 
into one integrated computational model that reflects the influence of culture on 
decision making in the domain. The key concepts used in our approach are described 
as follows (see Table 1 for an overview). 
Table 1. An overview of the key concepts 
Dimensions Cultural factors Parameters ranging over 1≤ i≤ m 
ranging Factor Factor Label set P: p1 … pm 
over label set value set default value: x1 … xm 
1≤ j≤ n L F adjusted value: x1′ … xm′ 
1 l11 f11  r111  rm11 
 … …  …  … 
 
11ql  11qf   111qr   11qmr  
…       
n ln1 fn1  r1n1  rmn1 
 … …  …  … 
 
nnql  nnqf   nnqr1   nmnqr  
 
The m parameters used in the domain model are labeled p1 through pm, with 
associated default values x1 through xm, for some reference culture, and values 
adjusted for culture x1′ through xm′.  For instance, in the ABMP negotiation model 
applied in the trading agents simulation, a parameter k is has label 
pk=“negotiation_speed”; it has a global default value xk for a particular context, equal 
for all agents; for each individual agent, the value is modified to its cultural adjusted 
value  xk′, so xk′ will probably be different for agents having different cultural profiles. 
For each culture dimension j, there is a range of qj cultural factor labels lj1 through 
jjql  with associated values fj1 through jjqf . Variable i is consistently used in this 
paper to range over parameters (values or labels), whereas j ranges over dimensions, 
and k over cultural factors per dimension j. For each factor label ljk and each 
parameter pi, there is a function rijk that maps factor value fjk and default value xi to 
adjusted parameter value xi′. Table 1 presents an overview of these key concepts. 
The integrated effect of culture on agent behavior can be modeled as a function h 
that maps a vector of cultural factors f
r
 and a vector of default values of model 
parameters xr  to a vector of culturally adjusted parameters x ′r : 
( ) xxfh ′= rrr,  . (1) 
The hypothesis of this work entails that, given the set of decision functions, a 
dimensional theory of culture can be used (a) to identify the cultural factors to be 
taken into account and (b) to define the mapping h. If this is possible, the agent 
modeling can benefit from vast bodies of social sciences literature that describe the 
differentiation of many behaviors along the dimensions of the cultural model. This 
literature can be used to define h for the wide range of behaviors described in it, 
assuming that we can formulate parameterized decision functions governing the 
behaviors. The literature is the basis for finding the attributes of agents and their 
relations which are relevant for moderation of the model parameters. This approach to 
integration of effects of cultural dimensions has been applied in [20], [30], [31]. In 
expert-systems based knowledge acquisition the effect of culture can be formulated in 
statements like: “In hierarchical societies there are differences in selected trade 
strategy. The higher ranked prefer to trade high quality valuable commodities to 
underline their status that fits their position in life. They will not avoid deals where 
less powerful opponents technically have the opportunity to defect, because the higher 
ranked rely on their power to enforce cooperation.” [25].  
This example refers to the effect of Hofstede’s power distance dimension. It refers 
to multiple decision processes: partner selection, delivery, and monitoring and 
enforcing. It illustrates that research and experts can explain the differentiation of 
behaviors along a single dimension on the basis of dimensional theory. It also 
illustrates that it is hard to acquire knowledge about the processes in isolation. 
Therefore, the approach is taken to first model individual dimensions and then 
integrate the models process-by-process. 
Table 2. Relevant factors with respect to trust and deceit, adapted from [20]; PDI*, UAI*, IDV*, 
MAS*, and LTO* represent Hofstede’s indices of culture, sa the agent’s own status, sb partner’s 
status, and db group distance between the agent and its partner; all variables were normalized to 
the interval [0,1]; + indicates an increasing effect on the parameter; – indicates a decreasing 
effect 
Effect on Dim-
ens-
ion 
index 
Culture and relational 
characteristics 
Cultural factor  
deceit 
thresh-
old 
inclin- 
ation 
to trace 
negative 
update 
factor 
positive 
update 
factor 
PDI Large power distance PDI*     
 - with higher ranked partn. max{0,PDI*(sb–sa)} + –   
 - with lower ranked partn. max{0,PDI*(sa–sb)}  –   
 Small power distance 1– PDI*     
UAI Uncertainty avoiding UAI*   + – 
 - with stranger UAI*⋅db – +   
 Uncertainty tolerant 1– UAI*     
IDV Individualistic IDV*     
 Collectivistic (1–IDV*)   +  
 - with in-group partner (1–IDV*)(1–db)  –   
 - with out-group partner (1–IDV*)db –    
MAS Masculine (competitive) MAS* – + –  
 Feminine (cooperative) 1– MAS*  –   
LTO Long-term oriented LTO* + – +  
 Short-term oriented (1–LTO*)     
 - with well-respected part. (1–LTO*)sb + –   
 - with other partners  (1–LTO*)(1–sb) –    
The example also illustrates that not just the values of the dimensional indices are 
relevant for modeling the effect of culture. Relational attributes are relevant as well. 
In this example Hofstede’s power distance index (PDI) is relevant. It orders countries 
on a scale with the most hierarchical culture at the high end and the most egalitarian 
country at the low end. Conditional upon the value of PDI, the status of the agent and 
its partner are relevant: “The higher ranked” refers to agents that have a high status sa 
in society; “less powerful opponents” refers to opponents with which the status 
difference sa−sb , where sb refers to opponent’s status, is high. So, in order to model 
cultural effects on decisions, not just the indices on the dimensions have to be taken 
into account as factors, but also relational attributes if their effect is differentiated 
across cultures. Based upon the example given, one can identify PDI⋅sa and 
PDI(sa−sb) as relevant factors in addition to PDI. 
Based on the knowledge acquired for all individual dimensions, all relevant 
cultural, relational and situational factors can be identified. In the example of trade the 
following have been identified as relevant relational attributes: status, in-group versus 
out-group membership, and the trust relation between partners. For instance, the 
vector of cultural factors influencing the decisions to deceive and to trust identified by 
Jonker et al. [20] can be taken from the column labeled “Cultural factor” in Table 2. 
Such a table is constructed for each process or group of processes, in this case the 
trade processes of delivery, monitoring and enforcing, and belief update. It contains 
the expert knowledge for cultural adaptation of the agents’ decision making. It 
contains the relevant cultural factors (on the rows) and the parameters to be adapted 
(in the columns). The cells describe the effect of culture on the parameters. 
Having identified f
r
 for a particular set of processes, and assuming that the vector 
of parameter values xr  follows from the chosen decision functions, it comes to the 
definition of the function h. h can be decomposed into a vector of functions gi , i.e., 
one per parameter, that map h’s arguments to the individual culturally adjusted 
parameter values xi′: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )xfgxfggxfgxfgxfh mm rrrrrKrrKrrrr ,,,,,,,,, 11 ===  , (2) 
so that 
( )
( )xfgx
xfgx
mm
rr
K
rr
,
,11
=′
=′
 . (3) 
The problem now is to find the functions gi for i=1,…,m. For this purpose the 
following hypothesis can be formulated: given that dimensional models of culture aim 
to provide for each dimension a linear ordering of the strength or frequency of 
occurrence of phenomena associated with that dimension, the effect of each cultural 
factor may be modeled as a strictly monotonic function rijk that adapts the i-th 
parameter to the k-th factor associated with the j-th dimension. rijk can be seen as a 
member of a set of functions r that can be indexed by the labels of cultural factors and 
parameters as arguments. rijk maps the value fjk of the cultural factor with label ljk into 
an effect eijk on the parameter with label pi: 
ijkijkijk exfr →×:  , (4) 
( )jkiijk lprr ,≡  , (5) 
and 
( ) ( )( )ijkjkiijkijkijk xflprxfre ,,, ==  , (6) 
where Ppi ∈ , the set of parameter labels, and Ll jk ∈ , the set of  factor labels. 
As the rijk are strictly monotonic, they can be classified as either increasing or 
decreasing. For each parameter label pi its set of factors Li+ that have an increasing 
effect and its set of factors Li− that have a decreasing effect can be defined: 
}{ increasing is |: ijkjkii rlLPp ≡∈∀ +  , (7) 
}{ decreasing is |: ijkjkii rlLPp ≡∈∀ −  . (8) 
By the knowledge acquisition process taken, the increasing and decreasing effects 
of the cultural factors can be identified, as illustrated in Table 2 [20]: Li+ is the set of 
factor labels that have a + sign in the column associated with the parameter labeled pi; 
Li− is the set of factor labels that have a minus sign in the column associated with pi.  
The next problem to solve is the combination of these influences into a single 
effect on each parameter, i.e. to identify the functions gi that moderate the effect of 
culture on the parameters. On the basis of expert knowledge the following rules can 
be formulated as hypotheses: 
1. In gi there is no interaction between the factors f
r
 and other parameters than xi. 
This assumes that any decision model can be formulated in such a way that any 
parameter can be modified for culture without taking the values of the other 
parameters into account. For the models we have implemented so far ([20], [30], 
[31])  this assumption is valid. 
2. The joint decreasing and the joint increasing effect can compensate for each other. 
This expertise is confirmed by expert statements, e.g. (in cultures with high power 
distance) “The powerful dictate the conditions. The less powerful have to accept. In 
feminine or collectivist cultures the powerful may exercise restraint, …” [25]. 
3. For the increasing and for the decreasing effects, the effect with the maximal 
influence is dominant: influences in the same direction do not reinforce each other. 
According to expert knowledge, if several factors influence a parameter in the 
same direction, it is sufficient for one to be maximal in order to sort maximal effect 
(disjunctive factor influence, see e.g. “feminine or collectivist”) under 2 above. 
4. Cultural factors working in the same direction do not reinforce each other. This 
means that, for instance, in Table 2 three factors are identified to have increasing 
effect on deceit threshold. If two of the factors have effect 0.5 and one has effect 
0.2, their joint effect is 0.5; not 0.4 (the average) or another linear combination (see 
3 above); not 0.8 (probabilistic) or another product combination. 
The first of these three hypotheses implies that the integration can be performed 
column-by-column using factor tables like Table 2, and we can write the functions as: 
( ) ( )iii xfgxfg ,, rrr =  . (9) 
The second hypothesis implies that the functions gi can each be defined as the sum 
of xi and a function 0≥+ig  that combines the increasing effects and a function 
0≤−ig that combines the decreasing effects: 
( ) ( ){ }( ) ( ){ }( )−−++ ∈+∈+≡ ijkijkijkiijkijkijkiiii LlxfrgLlxfrgxxfg |,|,,r  . (10) 
For the functions gi+ and gi− a range of function types were experimented with 
(probabilistic and linear combinations, to name the most obvious). However, under 
the third and fourth hypotheses all except weak disjunction proved to be untenable3.  
We found that both gi+ and gi− can be written as a weak disjunction: 
( ){ }( ) ( ){ }+++ ∈=∈ ijkijkijkijkijkijki LlxfrLlxfrg |,max|,  , (11) 
( ){ }( ) ( ){ }−−− ∈=∈ ijkijkijkijkijkijki LlxfrLlxfrg |,min|,  . (12) 
Equations (11) and (12) enable the integration of the computational models 
constructed for the single dimensions. For this the form of the functions ( ) ( )( )ijkjkiijkijk xflprxfr ,,, =  has to be defined. All that is known so far about these 
functions is that they are strictly monotonic. As long as there is no further evidence, a 
first order approach can be taken, i.e., let rijk adjust xi proportionally to fjk from its 
default value in the direction of the extreme values iijk x>
+ε  and iijk x<
−ε  : 
( ) ( ) jkiijkijkijkijki fxxfrLlkjPpi −=∈∀∀∈∀ ++ ε,:|:|  , (13) 
( ) ( ) jkiijkijkijkijki fxxfrLlkjPpi −=∈∀∀∈∀ −− ε,:|:|  . (14) 
Under this first order approach, using (11) and (12), (10) becomes: 
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 Weak disjunction is consistent with the hypotheses 3 and 4 above. Any linear or product 
combination of cultural factor is not. 
( ) ( ){ } ( ){ }−−++ ∈−+∈−+= ijkjkiijkijkjkiijkiii LlfxLlfxxxfg |min|max, εεr  . (15) 
In practice, the values of +ijkε  and 
−
ijkε  are unknown. However, minimal and 
maximal values can be assumed not to depend on the cultural dimension j, and 
estimates −iεˆ and 
+
iεˆ can be determined per model parameter. Under the assumptions 
+++
=∈∀∀∈∀ iijkijki LlkjPpi εε ˆ:|:|  , (16) 
−−−
=∈∀∀∈∀ iijkijki LlkjPpi εε ˆ:|:|  , (17) 
(15) can be written (N.B.: 0ˆ >−+ ii xε  and 0ˆ <−− ii xε ): 
( ) ( ) { } ( ) { }−−++ ∈−+∈−+= ijkjkiiijkjkiiiii LlfxLlfxxxfg |maxˆ|maxˆ, εεr  . (18) 
Concluding, given default values for a specific context, e.g. trade in biologically 
grown vegetables or trade in second hand cars, and realistic minimal and maximal 
values for each parameter, using knowledge represented as in Table 2, the function in 
equation (18) can be used to estimate parameter values xi′ that are adjusted for culture. 
4   Conclusion 
This paper presents an approach to the modeling of cultural differentiation in 
multi-agent based simulations. It argues that a dimensional theory of culture is a good 
basis for middle-range agent-based models that simulate differentiation over a broad 
range of cultures. The decomposition of cultural phenomena into a set of linear 
orderings on a limited number of dimensions enables dimension-by-dimension 
modeling of cultural effects. The concept of Synthetic Cultures, well tested in 
practice, shows that dimension-by-dimension scripts give rise to believable, if 
unrealistic, behavior. As the dimensions provide a linear ordering, it is reasonable to 
assume that each dimension (and relational attributes relevant for differentiation of 
behavior associated with it) has a strictly monotonic effect on decision rule 
parameters, if all other factors are kept constant. 
The integration of effects of all dimensions is based on (1) a division of effects in a 
subset of increasing and a subset of decreasing effects per parameter, (2) the use of a 
weak disjunction of the effects per cultural factor, and (3) compensation of increasing 
effects for decreasing effects and vice versa. The approach has been applied in several 
simulations of trade processes and has been validated to produce realistic tendencies 
across cultures in expert-validations. 
An approach as followed in this paper aims to reproduce general tendencies of 
behavioral differentiations across cultures at an aggregated level. It can be used as a 
research instrument to generate hypotheses about behavioral differentiation that can 
be validated in experiments, or to validate theories induced from experimental results. 
As a mid-range model, it cannot be used to predict effects of culture in actual 
situations or at the individual level. 
The approach was applied to simulations of trade processes, on the basis of 
Hofstede's five-dimensional theory of culture (e.g. [23]), but it is not specific for this 
domain and this theory of culture. It could also be applied to other domains, or other 
theories of culture, provided that parameterized decision models are available that 
may be expected to have general validity across cultures, and that sufficient 
knowledge for cultural adaptation can be acquired from social sciences literature and 
experts.  
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